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The article analyzes Giorgio Agamben’s methodological tool of regression against the back-
ground of Jewish messianism. Although the term is obviously borrowed from Freudian psycho-
analysis, Agamben’s reading of regression has a distinct messianic spin: it means a movement 
toward prelinguistic existence (infancy), prior to the ontological split within the subject generated 
by language. This quasi-Edenic narrative might be called a ‘Heideggerian moment’ of Agamben’s 
thought but I argue – with reference to Infancy and History and Signature of All Things – that it 
is actually deeply rooted in Jewish tradition. The aim of the article is to 1) demonstrate the crypto-
theological background of regression to infancy and 2) critically analyze Agamben’s idea of ‘re-
gressive’ subjectivity beyond the principle of signification.  
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We must dream backwards, toward the source, we must row back up the centuries,  
beyond infancy, beyond the beginning, (…) toward the living center of origin 
(Octavio Paz, The Broken Waterjar) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In his widely discussed essay Progress or Return?, Leo Strauss contemplates two 
fundamental political and religious concepts – progress and return – in the context 
of Jewish tradition. He famously argues that the modern ideal of progress has back-
fired, leading us to “the brink of an abyss” (Strauss 1997: 87) and bringing about an 
unprecedented crisis of Western civilization. Consequently, a contemporary man 
needs to be ‘redeemed’ from progress and brought back to tradition. The applica-
tion of the messianic idiom to the critique of progress might be surprising, but 
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Strauss’s argument is that messianic idea in Judaism has been primarily associated 
with restoration, not progress; progressive messianism is merely a secular, political 
distortion of its original, restorative message.  
To support his thesis, Strauss refers to the findings of Gershom Scholem, whose 
work was mostly devoted to the analysis of the messianic idea in Jewish kabbalah. 
“As I learn from Scholem” – says Strauss – “Kabbala prior to the sixteenth century 
concentrated upon the beginning; it was only with Isaac Luria that Kabbala began 
to concentrate upon the future – upon the end. Yet even here, the last age became 
as important as the first. It did not become more important” (Strauss 1997: 88). He 
then quotes Scholem’s Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism where we read that “for 
Luria «salvation means actually nothing but restitution, reintegration of the original 
whole, or tikkun, to use the Hebrew term. (…) The path to the end of all things is 
also the path to the beginning»” (Strauss 1997: 88)1. This leads Strauss to conclude 
that Jewish messianism is in its essence concerned with teshuva, or return; the life 
of the Jew might be “a life of anticipation, of hope, but the hope for redemption is 
restoration – restitutio in integro” (Strauss 1997: 88). 
What Strauss fails to add in his impressive apology of the origins is that the mes-
sianism of modern Jewish kabbalah is much more nuanced. Although single ex-
cerpts might indeed show Luria as a conservative spirit, Scholem repeatedly high-
lights “a strictly utopian impulse” (Scholem 1971: 13) of the Lurianic myth. His 
fundamental essay Toward an Understanding of the Messianic Idea in Judaism ex-
plicates that when Luria and his disciples speak of re-establishing the original per-
fection, they do not mean the return to any actual origins but to the potentiality 
which – due to fundamental cosmological ruptures2 – failed to actualize. In Scho-
lem’s own words, the Lurianic olam ha-ba “does not correspond to any condition 
of things that has ever existed even in Paradise, but at most to a plan contained in 
the divine idea of Creation” (Scholem 1971: 13). Consequently, tikkun is “not so 
much a restoration of Creation (…) as its first complete fulfillment” (Scholem 1969: 
117).  
The dispute between Strauss and Scholem – two of the most prominent Jewish 
thinkers of the twentieth century – is a useful framework for the analysis of Giorgio 
Agamben’s methodological tool of regression which I carry out in this article. Alt-
hough the term is obviously borrowed from Freudian psychoanalysis, Agamben’s 
reading of regression has a distinct messianic spin: it means a movement toward 
prelinguistic existence, prior to the ontological split within the subject generated by 
language. This quasi-Edenic narrative might be called a ‘Heideggerian moment’ of 
 
1 The original to be found in Scholem 1946: 256, 274. 
2 Lurianists invested in the mythical image of shevirat ha-kelim (“breaking of the vessels”) - a found-
ing catastrophe which results in a general deficiency and displacement of things in this world. In 
Scholem’s words: “Nothing remains in its proper place. Everything is somewhere else, (…) in exile, 
(…) in need of being redeemed” (Scholem 1969: 112-113). More on these cosmological ruptures to 
be found in Fine 2003.  
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Agamben’s thought, but I argue that it is actually deeply rooted in Jewish tradition. 
To demonstrate this crypto-theological background, I refer both to Signatura rerum 
[The Signature of All Things] – the work in which Agamben’s theory of regression 
is elaborated – and Infanzia e storia [Infancy and History] where the concept of 
prelinguistic existence (infancy) is used to speculate about life inseparable from lan-
guage. I propose to think of regression as a dialogue with both the restorative mes-
sianism put forward by Strauss and its dialectical variations to be found in Scholem, 
but also argue that Agamben’s ‘regressive’ messianism – ingenious as it is – remains 
hopelessly torn between the phantasm of original perfection and the utopia of a 
return “to that which never was” (Agamben 1991: 97). Specifically, it is my conten-
tion that the theory of infancy contradicts the premises of regression which is sup-
posed to set the ground for its coming, and makes Agamben’s idea of regressive 
subject highly problematic.  
Surprisingly, although the concept of regression is of primary importance for 
Agamben’s methodology and ontology, it has been a subject of hardly any system-
atic research. It is usually just briefly mentioned by scholars in the context of para-
digm and signature, whose theories indeed make up the core of The Signature of 
All Things (McQuillan 2010; Snoek 2010). The only elaborate analysis of regres-
sion as such is to be found in Colby Dickinson’s Agamben and Theology (2011), 
where it is aptly related to the idea of infancy. However, as Dickinson’s book is 
written from a Christian perspective, it fails to comment on the Jewish messianic 
background of Agamben’s regression. My paper fills this serious gap and brings out 
the camouflaged Jewish references to demonstrate the idea of regression as an im-
portant contribution to the debate on the actuality of messianism. At the same time, 
it critically analyzes the relation of regression to infancy, and sheds some light on 
their theoretical incongruity.  
2. REGRESSION 
The concept of regression appears in a chapter of The Signature of All Things 
titled Philosophical Archaeology3, where Foucauldian terminology is applied to re-
define philosophical inquiry into the past. Agamben argues that arché, being the 
proper object of any archaeological practice, is not a factitious origin that chrono-
logically precedes the present, nor a metaphysical principle from which all things 
have developed. It is rather “the point from which the phenomenon takes its 
source” (Agamben 2009a: 89), and the moment when dominant discourses have 
been constituted. As such, the archaeology both Foucault and Agamben have in 
 
3 The notions of archaeology and genealogy, whose Agamben fails to differentiate, are important 
for his later works and are to be found e.g. in the subtitles of The Kingdom and the Glory (Agamben 
2011a) and The Sacrament of Language (Agamben 2011b). 
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mind needs history to “dispel the chimeras of the origin” (Agamben 2009a: 83)4 and 
recognize fundamental tensions inherent in each historical practice.   
If we realize how much Agamben’s philosophy owes to Martin Heidegger, his 
critique of sources and tradition cannot help but evoke Heidegger’s famous distinc-
tion into “history” (Geschichte) and “historicity/historicality” (Geschichtlichkeit). As 
we read in Being and Time, “historicity as a temporal mode of being (…) is prior to 
what is called history (…); it is the ground for the fact that something like the disci-
pline of ‘world history’ is at all possible” (Heidegger 1996: 17). What any revisionist 
spirit might find appealing is especially Heidegger’s project of revealing this ground 
and returning to the ‘true’ origins of phenomena that so far have been concealed or 
made inaccessible by the dominant metaphysical tradition. However, Agamben is 
careful to make it clear that the arché he thinks of is neither to be found in a distant 
past, nor is it metahistorical in its nature. Rather than Heidegger, then, he follows 
Friedrich Nietzsche in his abandonment of the term Ursprung (“origin”) in favour 
of Entstehung (“emergence”), not in the sense of genesis, but the dynamic arising 
of things (Agamben 2009a:  83)5. He thereby demonstrates once again that philo-
sophical archaeology is not about the nature of the past but about the emergence of 
the present, and, as such, it favours process of formation over an alleged essence of 
things.  
Quite surprisingly, but perhaps in accordance with his strategy of covering tracks, 
Agamben fails to mention that this is precisely how origin was conceptualized by 
Walter Benjamin, another of his philosophical masters. Instead of rejecting the 
term, like Nietzsche and Foucault, Benjamin chooses its “strong misreading” 
(Bloom 2003) and comes up with the idea of origin as emergence. Although origin 
– he argues in the preface to the work on German tragic drama – is a historical 
category, it has nothing to do with the idea of genesis as the inception of some phe-
nomena at a certain moment in time. To think of origin as the very first link in the 
chronological chain of causes and effects would correspond to the conception of 
“homogeneous and empty” time that Benjamin harshly criticized as “bourgeois” 
(Benjamin 2006: 396)6. Rather, the origin is “an eddy in the stream of becoming” 
(Benjamin 2003: 45), an operative force convulsing the body of history from the 
inside, which makes it not metahistorical, but transhistorical. As Agamben himself 
aptly puts it elsewhere, in a clear polemic with the Straussian idiom of restoration, 
“the return to the origin that is at issue here thus in no way signifies the reconstruc-
tion of something as it once was, the reintegration of something into an origin un-
derstood as a real and eternal figure of its truth” (Agamben 1999c: 152).  
 
4The original to be found in Foucault 1998: 373.  
5 See also Foucault 1998. 
6 To make things a little more confusing, let us note that Benjamin rejects the notion of Enstehung 
for precisely the same reasons why Nietzsche failed to invest in Ursprung: he associates it with descent, 
not emergence.  
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It is exactly this idea of the origin that Agamben’s messianism of regression seems 
modelled on. In a crucial fragment of his essay, Agamben points to a structural 
analogy between the philosophical archaeology he has just worked out and the psy-
choanalytic regression therapy7. In a classical Freudian approach, regression was 
defined as a backward movement of the subject to an earlier stage of development 
in response to some traumatic memories that could not be handled in a more adap-
tive way. The task of the analysis, sometimes called therapeutic regression, was to 
identify the repressed, unconscious origin of trauma in order to help the patient 
work through it and eventually neutralize its effect on consciousness (Heimann and 
Isaacs 2002: 169). Agamben follows the psychoanalytic intuition not without making 
a slight but meaningful adjustment to it. What he calls “archaeological regression” 
(Agamben 2009a: 98) is a therapy that confronts the historical ‘repressed’ not by 
exploring the unconscious but rather identifying and deconstructing the very source 
of the split into conscious and unconscious. In other words, instead of seeking a 
moment prior to binary divisions, Agamben chooses to work on the moment they 
have been generated. Why is that? Picturing the ‘before’ as a state of prelapsarian 
unity, he claims, means following the logic of the split: only in the world governed 
by the principle of divisions is the mirage of original non-division possible as its 
opposite. The alternative would be to think from beyond the split, where nothing 
like a historical origin exists, there is just spontaneous emergence or arising. What 
Agamben’s regression then leans toward is not “to restore a previous stage, but to 
decompose, displace, and ultimately bypass it in order to go back not to its content 
but to the modalities, circumstances, and moments in which the split, by means of 
repression, constituted it as origin” (Agamben 2009a: 103).  
We have already seen that for Agamben the idea of restoring a previous stage is 
nothing but a phantasm. However, what we are regressing to in the archaeological 
practice remains yet unclear: is it some other past or is it past at all? In other words, 
what is the temporal structure of such regression? Further in the essay, Agamben 
notes that, technically speaking, his project is more about the present than the past, 
or, if we insist on this word, about the past that “somehow has remained present” 
because it “has not been lived through” (Agamben 2009a: 102). One can easily cap-
ture here similarities to Scholem’s account of the Lurianic ‘return’ as the restitution 
of potentiality, which Agamben must also have in mind when he speculates on com-
ing back to “a present where we have never been” (Agamben 2009b: 52)8. However, 
as the liberation of history is always projected into what is going to come, the practice 
of regression also points to the future, and, in Agamben’s view, it somehow com-
plements the angel of history whose powerful image has been drawn by Benjamin 
 
7 Agamben credits an Italian philosopher Enzo Melandri with first exposing the analogies between 
Foucault’s and Freud’s methodology. 
8 That Agamben was well acquainted with the utopian-restorative idiom of the Jewish kabbalah is 
to be seen in Agamben 1999b: 167-168.  
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in his famous ninth thesis. If Benjamin’s angel is driven into the future while “turned 
toward the past” (Benjamin 2006: 392), the ‘angel’ of regression moves backward 
with a gaze fixed on the future. When they catch a fleeting glimpse of each other, 
claims Agamben, it becomes clear that the “invisible goal” (Agamben 2009a: 99) of 
their procession in time is the present.  
If the implicit allusions to the Jewish kabbalah and explicit references to Benja-
min are not yet enough to speak of regression as a messianic enterprise, the ultimate 
argument is offered by the author himself who terms regression – perhaps a little 
self-ironically – an “almost soteriological” practice (Agamben 2009a: 98). The idiom 
of messianism is further applied in the final paragraphs of the essay when Agamben 
recapitulates the relation of archaeology to history. Their interdependence, he ar-
gues, corresponds to the relation between redemption and creation in the three 
monotheistic religions (Agamben 2009a: 107-108). While creation obviously pre-
cedes redemption in time, it is only the latter that makes creation intelligible and 
meaningful. As such, the work of redemption follows in chronology but precedes 
in rank, which is precisely how archaeology relates to history. And if Agamben 
might want to quote Scholem’s kabbalistic reflections, he could put the relationship 
even more aptly: it is only redemption that for the first time brings fulfillment to 
creation.  
3. INFANCY 
Calling in the big theological guns implies that the stakes of regression are much 
higher than just a reconceptualization of the origin. Indeed, Agamben’s methodo-
logical essay shall not be discussed alone, but rather as a chronological follower and 
logical antecedent of Infancy and History. Only read against this early work on the 
relation of time and language, archaeological regression fully reveals its significance. 
Through the concept of infancy, Agamben tries to convince us that the fracture 
underlying our vision of history constitutes all the condition of being-human. There 
is a formative split upon which our lives are founded; the split generating further 
divisions that we, as mankind, are hopelessly involved in. Its persistence stems from 
the fact that the founding split is produced by the essential property of being-human: 
the use of language, and can only be neutralized, Agamben contends, through an 
infantile experience of wordlessness. His archaeological project is thus about re-
gressing to an infancy in order to deactivate the divisions produced by our language 
and think of humans as speaking beings beyond this negative grounding.  
But first things first. From Humboldt and Hamann on, modern philosophy has 
demonstrated how language and human subjectivity are intertwined. All post-tran-
scendental critiques of the subject accentuate that consciousness independent of 
language is a phantasm, and human is only constituted as the individual through the 
use of words. However, to argue it is the capacity of speaking which differentiates 
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humans from other animals is highly anachronic – modern life sciences have proved 
that a number of animals use advanced sound communication. What is really char-
acteristic of human animals, Agamben points out, is rather a constitutive gap be-
tween actual speech and the symbolic system of language. Unlike other animals, 
who are born in language – “they are always and totally language” (Agamben 1993: 
52) – humans receive it from the outside, and can only enter the kingdom of speech 
once they have learned to use meaningful sounds9. For Agamben, this distance be-
tween the semiotic (language signs) and semantic (discourse) has some serious con-
sequences for the subject. First, we do not own our language but have to wrest it for 
ourselves; as such, language is not a human property as the Aristotelian tradition of 
zōon logon echon has affirmed, but an external apparatus from which we are origi-
nally alienated. Second, as already mentioned, the foundational rupture into the 
living self and the speaking self generates further separations, like the political op-
position of the individual and the common. It is therefore the separating nature of 
language that Agamben makes responsible for the specious alternative of liberalism 
and communitarianism that determines our political spectrum (Agamben 2007: 9). 
Last but not least, if human discourse has to be mediated by the sign system, the 
price we pay for sophisticated communication based on general and abstract terms 
is the loss of immediacy; animals are one with their language, we are not. The en-
trance into language is also reductionist in the sense that the moment we actualize 
our linguistic capacity and start to produce words, we lose the original potentiality 
to say anything in any language. As Daniel Heller-Roazen puts it, “it is as if the 
acquisition of language were possible only through an act of oblivion, a kind of lin-
guistic infantile amnesia” (Heller-Roazen 2005: 11).  
The infantile, pre-subjective experience of language is precisely what Agamben 
wants to save in his messianic enterprise. Infancy10, he argues, is not just the psycho-
somatic stage of human development when an individual has not yet learned to 
speak. It is rather the original form of language in a Benjaminian sense of the word 
– a fleeting experience of ineffability that not only chronologically precedes but also 
kairotically coexists with conventional language (Agamben 1993: 48). As such, in-
fancy is a gap in the structure of language, “a break with the continual opposition of 
diachronic and synchronic, historical and structural” (Agamben 1993: 49-50), which 
pushes beyond its boundaries toward the pure potentiality of speech.  
There is also another phrase which grasps the elusive nature of infancy: the state 
of exception. In Agamben’s widely discussed work on this political and legal phe-
nomenon we read that it introduces a “zone of indistinction” (Agamben 2005a: 26), 
in which one can no longer tell the difference between norm and anomaly. 
 
9 This problem is elaborated in Language and Death (Agamben 1991) where Agamben explicates 
this original distance through the idea of the Voice, being the negative metaphysical foundation of 
human ‘being-in-language’.  
10 Or rather: in-fancy. 
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Analogically, the experience of original wordlessness makes it impossible to distin-
guish the inside of language from its outside, and the crucial split into the living and 
speaking being is – at least momentarily – deactivated. In other words, when infancy 
is incorporated to our linguistic nature as a formative exception, a chance opens for 
the human animal to coincide with his language while still being separated. And if 
we remember that man is only subjectified by the discontinuity between discourse 
and language, it is then perfectly right to call infancy “both remnant of the animal 
and potential for the post-human” (Watkin 2010: 13)11.  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Read against infancy, regression is no longer a humble methodological tool, but 
a fundamental metaphysical concept which challenges the divisions that have so far 
determined Western ontology, the linguistic split within the subject being of su-
preme importance. However, at times Agamben’s theories of regression and in-
fancy look antinomic rather than complementary, and these are precisely some dis-
crepancies that I would like to bring out now. The first one concerns the status of 
origin vis-à-vis the unconscious. As already noted, Agamben conceives of infancy as 
the unchronological origin to be sought in and not before language. At the same 
time, the elusive nature of infancy reminds him of Freud’s concept of the uncon-
scious: whereas the latter “occupies the submerged part of psychic territory” (Agam-
ben 1993: 48), the former is latent on the margins of language. As if anticipating 
objections, Agamben is quick to stipulate that the unconscious he means is not prec-
edent of consciousness but rather originally coexistent with it in the form of “interior 
monologue” (Agamben 1993: 48). In other words, it is the unchronological origin 
of consciousness just like infancy is the unchronological origin of language. How-
ever, even if we take Agamben’s ‘kairotical’ theory of the unconscious at face value 
and weave it into his reading of the origin, it is still fundamentally inconsistent with 
the premises of regression. As we remember, his main objection to psychoanalysis 
formulated in Philosophical Archaeology was that by investing in the unconscious, 
it reinforces the psychic division into the Ego and the Id instead of trying to deacti-
vate it. Archaeological regression, on the contrary, shall not be about exploring the 
unconscious but about questioning the dualistic nature of the self. How does this 
relate, one could ask, to the discussion of infancy as the unconscious of language? 
It looks like the reproduction of the psychological split (conscious/unconscious) is 
the price Agamben has decided to pay for the deactivation of the linguistic one (lan-
guage/discourse). But if we recall there are no mental states beyond language and 
human psyche is always ‘linguistic’, is there any split made inoperative at all?  
 
11 More on infancy as a chance to deactivate the anthropological machine in Agamben 2004. 
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Second, and more importantly, there is the problem of deactivation which moti-
vates both regression and infancy. According to Agamben’s major thesis, the sepa-
ration introduced to our creaturely lives by the apparatus of language is that into the 
living being and the speaking being. Unlike other animals, whom Karl Marx de-
scribes as “immediately one with [their] life activity” (Marx 2010: 276), the human 
animal has no direct relation to language, and it is thanks to this gap between life 
and speech that the experience of infancy is possible. Without it, Agamben admits, 
man would be fully united with his nature, there would be no “historicity of lan-
guage” (Agamben 1993: 52) and no history at all. However, it is crucial to notice a 
significant paradox inscribed in infancy: while it seems to reassure the anthropolog-
ical difference between human and other animals, it is also tested by Agamben as a 
means to deconstruct the difference by deactivating the mechanisms that separate 
humans from the system of language. In other words – indeed a trademark of 
Agamben’s messianism – what generates divisions is also supposed to make them 
inoperative. To do this, as we have seen, infancy establishes a zone of indistinction 
in the likeness of the state of exception, which results in the original split being not 
erased but neutralized, likewise the alienation of human subjects from their own 
animality. It is precisely this parallel to the state of exception, I argue, that seems the 
most problematic here. In a fragment of Homo Sacer devoted to the analysis of 
exception, Agamben makes it clear that on the threshold of indistinction between 
law and life the latter is absorbed by the former, much more powerful as governed 
by the principle of sovereignty (Agamben 1998: 53). He also claims that law is not 
the sole domain of sovereignty, whose attribute is the “unlimited power” (Schmitt 
2005: 10) over life; another one is language. The question must be asked, then, if 
the indistinction that infancy generates between man and language does not result 
in the human subject being fully subjected to the linguistic apparatus? Obviously, 
Agamben specifies that it is only the sovereign state of exception where language 
wholly “coincides with reality itself” (Agamben 2005b: 105)12; the messianic state of 
exception produced by infancy would be that of “immediate mediation” (Agamben 
1999a), where humans coincide with language while still being separated from it. 
But are there any safety measures to secure the minimum of separation once it has 
been blurred by Agamben’s experimentum linguae? Is the ”tiny displacement” 
(Agamben 2007: 53) of sovereignty and messianism not just too tiny this time?  
This problem returns in the important essay The Idea of Language, where 
Agamben meditates on the religious concept of revelation to conclude that it is not 
so much the truth of being that is revealed in the word of God but the truth of 
language. The truth, he argues, is that “humans can reveal beings through language 
but cannot reveal language itself” (Agamben 1999a: 40). Why is that? As we learn 
 
12 Although this remark is on law and not language, Agamben famously argues that both these 
apparatuses are structurally analogous and governed by the logic of sovereign exception (Agamben 
1998: 20-21; Agamben 2005a: 36-37). 
284  PIOTR SAWCZYŃSKI 
from the Lurianic kabbalah, the power of words, being the original domain of di-
vinity, is too great for finite creatures to absorb; it is only through fractures and sep-
arations that this power might be diminished and words used to communicate. It 
means that – as Scholem puts it – “only that which is fragmentary makes language 
expressible” (Biale 1985: 87); any direct, unmediated access to language has been 
barred and had it not, words would be “unmerciful” to human subjectivity (Scholem 
2003: 216)13. Although expressed in religious terms, these kabbalistic intuitions offer 
a significant critique of language which fails to be convincingly confronted by Agam-
ben’s profane messianism. As a result, how to neutralize the linguistic split within 
the human subject without exposing him to the “unmerciful” power of language 
remains unclear. What is clear, though, is another discrepancy between regression 
and infancy: whereas the first was meant to redefine subjectivity by deactivating its 
negative grounding, the latter risks reinforcing this negativity by empowering the 
linguistic sovereign. It seems like at a crucial point these two messianic concepts 
hopelessly miss each other; they resemble the angels of history who just exchange 
glances while moving in two different directions. 
As we have seen throughout the discussion, the regression to infancy is about 
‘restoring’ the full potentiality of our linguistic origins. As such, it backs up Scho-
lem’s kairotical idea of return against Strauss’s longing for the actual beginnings. 
Paradoxically, though, the idiom of “immediate mediation” brings Agamben much 
closer to the Straussian way of thinking, where separations and discontinuities are 
considered obstruction rather than safeguard. While these inconsistencies of his 
crypto-theological project might be considered a flaw, they are actually symptomatic 
of all Jewish messianism, with the idea of return to the origins hopelessly stretched 
between restoration and utopia. One could thus say that as long as Agamben’s think-
ing lives on antitheses, it remains faithful to its crypto-theological background; but 
would it not be itself a paradoxical conclusion to the philosophy which makes for 
deactivation of opposites?  
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